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Remedying Trade Remedies
“The heart of our national economic
policy long has been faith in the value of
competition.”♣
Sungjoon Cho♠
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Remedying Trade Remedies
Introduction
Ever since the birth of the Union, competition has been an ideological beacon of
its economic governance. Both the people and the government of the United States have
believed that “the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces” will bring them
prosperity and progress.1 Based on this belief, the United States enacted the Sherman
Act,2 established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),3 split Standard Oil4 and AT&T,5
and more recently challenged Microsoft’s abuse of its monopoly in the personal computer
operating system market.6
Nonetheless, competition has mostly been an internal affair involving domestic
economic players.7 While internal competition is highly protected in the domestic market,
external competition from foreign producers has largely been neglected and thus failed to
be factored into antitrust scrutiny. On the contrary, the government, through its trade
policies, has often hampered foreign competition to protect domestic producers at the
expense of all the benefits that foreign competition might bring to the economy.8 In
particular, the antidumping statute enables the government to impose additional tariffs
on foreign imports to neutralize their price competitiveness under the disingenuous
rationale of unfair trade.9 In addition to its price-fixing nature, the antidumping regime
further restrains trade when it is used to harass foreign rivals through a strategy labeled
“non-price predation.” Non-price predation involves filing spurious petitions whose main
purpose is to terrorize rivals regardless of the merit in initiating an antidumping
proceeding.10 In fact, nearly a half of all antidumping petitions turn out to be without
merits.11
Northern Pac. Ry. v. U. S., 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2004). (originally passed July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209)
3
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §41 (1914)
4
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
5
U.S. v. Amer. Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
6
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
7
Regarding a notable exception, see Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (ruling
that foreign companies operating in foreign countries might still be found to violate the Sherman Act if they
attempted to restrain trade within the Unites States).
8
See EINAR HOPE, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES: COHERENCE OR CONFLICT 3 (1998) (observing that
a captured, protectionist policy undermines competition policy, and hence market inefficiency as well as
deteriorated consumers’ welfare).
9
Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Antidumping and Market Disruption: The Incentive Effects of
Antidumping Laws, in THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
[hereinafter THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM] 155, 164 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1993) (viewing the fair
trade rationale as “red herring”). See also JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991).
10
See generally Pierre F. De Ravel Esclapon, Non-Price Predation and the Improper Use of U.S. Unfair Trade
Laws, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 543, 549 (1987).
11
Elizabeth L. Gunn, Eliminating the Protectionist Free Ride: The Need for Cost Redistribution in Antidumping
Cases, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 165, 177 (2005).
1
2

2

Remedying Trade Remedies

When confronted by the disturbing anticompetitive effects that these trade
remedies tend to create, one may argue that antitrust authorities, in particular the FTC,
should expand their hitherto largely domestic jurisdiction to international trade, thereby
subjecting trade remedies to antitrust scrutiny. In doing so, the FTC can protect
competition itself, not competitors.12 However, the FTC’s potential antitrust mission over
trade remedies is severely obstructed by a judicially created antitrust immunity labeled the
“Noerr-Pennington doctrine.”13 As a legal reincarnation of political pluralism under the
Warren court, this doctrine expansively immunizes antidumping petitioners from any
antitrust investigations over their potentially trade-restraining behaviors. Although the
doctrine does have its own limitation, “the sham exception,” courts have interpreted the
exception in an extremely narrow fashion to the extent that it nearly marginalizes its
purposefulness in the antidumping context.
This gap in enforcement of antitrust disciplines with regards to trade remedies is
highly troubling. Foremost among concerns are the notoriously loose standards in
determining dumping and injury, the central parameters of antidumping remedies. The
present antidumping proceedings are vulnerable to manipulation by petitioners who are
tempted to inflate, exaggerate and even misrepresent facts and data to prevail in dumping
and injury determinations. The lack of antitrust enforcement as a backstop to trade
remedies based on these misrepresentations tends to pass restraints on competition into
the marketplace. Furthermore, while the demand for protectionism at home rises,
globalization increasingly exposes the domestic economy to import penetration. A series
of global trade talks has led to the replacement of conventional barriers, such as tariffs, by
more esoteric administrative barriers, such as antidumping remedies. Consequently, if left
unchecked, the frequent abuse of trade remedies is likely to multiply damages to the
economy resulting from the stifling of competition in the marketplace.
Against this backdrop, I argue in this Article that the failure to allow antitrust
oversight when implementing trade remedies should be rectified by means of judicial and
administrative intervention. I do not propose herein a repealing of the current
antidumping statute: such a drastic measure would be politically infeasible in the current
protectionist atmosphere of Congress.14 Instead, I take a more modest yet realistic stance:
sanitizing antidumping remedies by bringing certain abusive behaviors in the antidumping
proceeding, such as deliberate misrepresentations of facts and data, under antitrust
12

A. Paul Victor, Task Force Report on the Interface between International Trade Law and Policy and
Competition Law and Policy: Introduction, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 463, 464 (1987).
13
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d
464; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626. For a case
employing the doctrine, see City of Columbia v. Omini Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379-380
(holding that federal antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking
anticompetitive action from the government because while appropriate in a business context, it is not
appropriate in the political arena).
14
See RAINER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN ANTIDUMPING LAWS
158 (1990)
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disciplines.15 In order to prevent such abuse of antidumping remedies by rent-seekers,
courts should interpret the currently narrow definition of the sham exception broadly
enough to effectively foreclose non-price predation. At the same time, the FTC, under its
vested antitrust authority, should reinforce its surveillance and enforcement activities to
guard against the abuse of trade remedies by domestic producers. In the long-term, these
targeted judicial and administrative interventions will eventually lead the public, and
legislators alike, to rethink the antidumping statute itself.
My thesis of remedying trade remedies via enhanced antitrust disciplines develops
in the following sequence. Part I divulges the flawed rhetoric of fair trade behind the
antidumping regime. It first traces the historical path of the antidumping statute to
highlight its ironic transformation from an antitrust statute to a mercantilist law. Then
the antidumping remedies’ façade legitimization under the fair trade mantra is exposed,
from both an economic and legal perspective. The article illustrates how antidumping
remedies lack economic sense because they neglect or misinterpret firms’ cost structure.
Also illustrated is the lack of legal sense because the ultimate normativity hinges not
purely on the merit of an underlying transaction, i.e., dumping, but cumulatively on its
commercial effect and injuries. Part I concludes with an analysis of the antidumping
remedies’ protectionist modus operandi, as evidenced by elusive concepts of prices and
injuries as well as procedural injustice.
In the absence of a genuine fair trade justification, antidumping measures remedy
nothing while creating distortions in market economies. Part II first defines antidumping
remedies as a Madisonian failure in that they only serve the special interests of a handful
of domestic producers, i.e., economic factions, at the expense of the entire economy. Part
II then explains a more serious antitrust failure in which antidumping remedies tend to fix
prices and restrain trade through a petitioner’s harassing behavior falling under the rubric
of non-price predation. This process of harassment and intimidation eventually leads to
cartelization of an industry.
Part III attempts to remedy the flaws of trade remedies by suggesting a course of
action. Radical measures, such as repealing the antidumping statute, are politically
infeasible. Therefore, this Part suggests that the FTC expand its statutory authority into
the area of international trade. At the same time, however, the Part also points out
potential obstruction of the FTC’s oversight of antidumping remedies by the NoerrPennington doctrine.
Taking note of potential obstructions to FTC oversight of antidumping remedies,
Part IV argues that the courts should adopt a broader interpretation of the sham
15

My proposal in the Article is basically in sync with other scholars who argue for some kind of antitrust
checks against trade policies. See e.g., Konstantinos Adamantopoulos & Diego De Notaris, The Future of the
WTO and the Reform of the Anti-dumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 30, 54-55
(2000) (proposing involvement by a domestic antitrust agency in an injury determinations to ensure
“competition principles”); Hoekman & Leidy, supra note _, at 170 (emphasizing cooperation between
domestic antitrust agencies and trade authorities).
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exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to facilitate the application of antitrust
disciplines to trade remedies. It is also argued that the FTC should target certain abusive
behaviors by antidumping petitioners, such as deliberate misrepresentations and repetitive
petitioning, because the current Noerr-Pennington jurisprudence certainly reserves room
for antitrust liability as to these unethical behaviors. The FTC can also monitor
petitioners’ behaviors by requiring them to register before they file antidumping
complaints in tandem with a similar requirement under the Webb-Pomerene Act. Part IV
concludes by raising the possibility of disapplying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to private
rights of action based on abusive behavior which may constitute a tortious interference
with business.
The Article concludes that a political marketplace ideal under the First
Amendment should not unduly absolve patent antitrust violations in apolitical areas such
as antidumping proceedings.

I. Demystifying Trade Remedies: A Fair Trade Rhetoric with Protectionist
Substances
A. Outlining the U.S. Antidumping Regime
1. Origin and Evolution
The historical developments of the antidumping regime in the U.S. offer a
powerful elucidation of its protectionist nature. The genesis of the U.S antidumping
regulation derived from antitrust concerns, rather than from the protection of domestic
industries. Influenced by the antitrust sentiments in the late nineteenth century, which
led to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the first U.S. antidumping statute, the
Antidumping Act of 1916, required the existence of “predatory intent” to punish foreign
dumping, and also imposed criminal liability for violations.16
The Antidumping Act of 1921 superseded the 1916 Act and provided a prototype
for the current antidumping statute.17 To protect infant U.S. industries from powerful
European “cartels,”18 the 1921 Act only required that there be “injuries” to domestic
16

J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation, WORLD BANK PAPER 783 (1991),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/783.html#provider; Douglas A. Irwin, Explaining the Rise in
U.S. Antidumping Activity, A Centennial of Antidumping Legislation and Implementation 2-5 (held at
University of Michigan, Mar. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/ADSym/Irwin.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Roy L. Prosterman, Withholding of Appraisement Under the United States Antidumping Act: Protectionism or
Unfair-Competition Law?, 41 WASH. L. REV. 315, 316 (1966).
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industries allegedly caused by foreign dumping without a separate requirement of
predatory intent. The only remedy of this new law was the imposition of duties equivalent
to the magnitude of dumping. It was this softened standard under the 1921 Act that
ushered in the administrative flexibility which enabled the government to manage trade
policies in the interests of domestic industries and in tune with protectionist political
climates.19 The 1921 Act also provided a basis for Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which authorizes domestic antidumping measures.20
Nonetheless, the protectionist enlistment of antidumping measures had not fully
materialized until the 1970’s. Tariff barriers still provided effective import relief in the
1950’s and 1960’s before the average tariffs began to significantly fall under the Kennedy
Round of trade talks in the late 1960’s.21 Despite the relatively steady number of
antidumping cases filed in the 1950s and 1960s, actual determinations of injuries were
rare during this period.22 This phenomenon may be explained by the lingering effects of
the 1916 Act which required the existence of a predatory intent. Although the text of the
1921 Act did not require the existence of predatory intent, only injury, the legislative
intent of the 1921 Act was still to address “commercial warfare,” i.e., potentially
aggressive (predatory) exporting by foreign producers. The 1921 Act was to prevent a
situation where “while temporarily cheaper prices are had our industries are destroyed
after which we more than repay in the exaction of higher prices.”23 This antitrust relic of
the antidumping statute maintained de facto the predatory intent requirement. Until the
1960’s, the Tariff Commission (the ITC’s predecessor) often based its injury
determination on the existence of predatory intent.24 The absence of predatory intent
frequently led the Tariff Commission to a negative finding of injury.25
Yet, the 1921 Act had begun to be stretched to serve a protectionist purpose as
the level of import penetration in the U.S. market (the import/GDP rate) increased from
3% in the 1950’s and 1960’s to 8% in the 1980’s. 26 “New protectionism”27 or
“administered protection”28 with a litany of non-traditional trade barriers (NTBs), such as
antidumping measures, emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s as traditional protectionist
devices, such as tariffs, waned through trade rounds. In 1980, the veering of U.S. trade
policy toward protectionism transferred the task of dumping determinations from the

19

Finger, supra note _, at 24.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Irwin, supra note _, at 9.
23
H.R. Rep. No. 1-67, at 23-24 (1921).
24
See e.g., Bicycles from Czech, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (1960); Carbon Steel Bars & Shapes from Can., 29 Fed.
Reg. 12599 (1964).
25
See e.g., Portland Cement from Dom. Rep., 27 Fed. Reg. 3872 (1962); Portland Cement from Can., 25
Fed. Reg. 2191 (1960); Rayon Staple Fiber from Fr., 24 Fed. Reg. 10092 (1959).
26
Irwin, supra note _, at 11
27
See Dominick Salvatore, Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the United States, 8 J.
POL’Y MODELING 125 (1987).
28
Krueger, supra note _, at 33-50.
20

6

Remedying Trade Remedies
Department of Treasury to the Department of Commerce (DOC).29 Before 1980,
dumping determinations were conducted by the Treasury Department, which seldom
delivered affirmative findings of injury. Frustrated by the Treasury Department’s
lukewarm posture toward a protectionist use of the antidumping statute, Congress took
away the Treasury Department’s authority over antidumping proceedings and accorded it
to the DOC whose major constituency is domestic producers.30
Moreover, in the 1970’s Congress expanded the scope of an antidumping
investigation from conventional price discrimination to sales below cost. U.S. domestic
firms often price their products below full costs to be more competitive. Yet, the Treasury
Department, then the antidumping agency, revised its administrative interpretation to
exclude sales below cost by foreign producers from the calculation of normal value on the
ground that these sales are not made “in the ordinary course of trade”31 This exclusion
naturally led to a higher probability of finding positive dumping margins. Originally, the
Treasury Department had wished to limit use of this expansive definition of dumping
under its reserved discretion. However, Congress led by the powerful Senator Russell
Long, then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, codified the expansive definition
in the 1974 Trade Act.32 The protectionist impact of this change can be attested by the
fact that more than half of the U.S. antidumping cases that followed concerned sales
below cost.33
In sum, as J. Michael Finger trenchantly observed, the very history of antidumping
reveals that the major purpose of the antidumping statute is sheer protectionism,
although this purpose is camouflaged by a “good public relations program.”34 Finger noted
that:
Adding this or that technical amendment – tailor-made to fit the situation of a
particular and powerful constituent – soon became another vehicle for constituent
service, the lifeblood of congressional politics.35
2. The Current System
The current U.S. antidumping statute36 is designed to protect domestic producers
from imports occurring at “less than fair value,” i.e., dumping.37 The antidumping statute
allows domestic producers to petition relevant government agencies to investigate alleged
29

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 6-7.
31
Finger, supra note _, at 28-29.
32
Id. at 29.
33
Id. at 28.
34
Id. at 13.
35
Id. at 26-27.
36
Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1673h, §§ 1675-1675b, §§ 1677-1677n.
37
19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (stating that imports at less than fair value constitute dumping).
30
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dumping practices by foreign producers (dumpers).38 If these agencies determine that
dumping is occurring and that it inflicts substantial, i.e., “material,” injury (or a threat
thereof)39 to the petitioner, the government executes a remedial action by imposing
antidumping duties on a foreign producer’s imports to cancel out such injurious effect.
In most cases, except for a self-initiation by the DOC,40 individual producers file
an antidumping complaint on behalf of a specific industry41 which produces a specific
product which is like or competitive with an alleged dumped product.42 Two different
government agencies, the International Trade Administration (ITA) under the DOC and
the International Trade Commission (ITC), are involved in the investigative process.43
Upon the initiation of an investigation, the ITC preliminarily decides whether the alleged
dumped import has caused material injury or a threat of injury to the petitioner.44 If the
ITC’s preliminary injury determination is affirmative, the ITA in turn decides on a
preliminary basis whether there is dumping, a sale in the U.S. at less than fair value.45
The ITA also calculates the degree of dumping, referred to as the “dumping
margin,”46 which determines the amount of antidumping duties. The dumping margin47 is
the difference between an imported goods’ home market price (normal value)48 and its
price in the U.S. market (export price).49 When the imported product is not consumed in
the exporting country’s home market, the ITA will substitute the product’s price in a
third market in which it is sold to arrive at normal value.50 If the ITA considers home
market prices unreliable for certain reasons,51 the ITA will construct normal values by
adding production costs and profits of its own reckoning.52 In calculating export price, the
ITA makes certain adjustments to ensure that the export price is “ex factory,” which does

38

19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (permitting domestic producers to petition an investigation).
19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A); § 1677(7)(A) (concerning material injury or threat thereof).
40
19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1) (authorizing the Commerce Department to self- initiate investigations).
41
19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C),(D),(E),(F) (defining interested parties as those manufacturing a domestic like
product;); § 1677(4) (defining industry and related parties).
42
19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (defining domestic like product).
43
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (referring to the “administrative authority” and the “commission” as determining facts
about dumping); § 1677(1) (defining the “administering authority” as the Secretary of Commerce); §
1677(2) (defining the “commission” as the International Trade Commission (ITC)).
44
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (requiring the ITC to make a preliminary determination of reasonable indication of
injury).
45
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (requiring a preliminary determination by the administering authority).
46
19 U.S.C. § 1677(b) (explaining the calculation of the dumping margins).
47
19 U.S.C. § 1677(35) (defining dumping margins).
48
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (explaining the calculation of normal value).
49
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (defining export price); § 1677a(c) (calculating export price).
50
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (allowing the ITA to use a third market to determine normal value); 19
C.F.R. § 351.404 (deciding which third market to use).
51
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (concerning below cost sales); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (concerning non-market
economies).
52
Id. Constructive normal value calculations are carried out by the ITA taking into account general factors
in the statutes. 19 C.F.R. § 351.405.
39
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not include post factory expenses, such as transportation costs.53 The ITA’s preliminary
determination on dumping and dumping margins is followed by a final determination.54 If
after the ITA’s final determination the ITC also issues a final determination finding a
material injury or a threat thereof,55 an order imposing antidumping duties (tariffs)
equivalent to the ITA’s final dumping margin56 will be collected at the border by the
Customs Office.57
Antidumping orders remain in effect unless they are revoked pursuant to a review
of the order.58 A foreign producer may request a review to revoke a final determination
resulting in an antidumping order by the ITA and ITC no earlier than two years after the
issuance of the order absent a showing of good cause.59 However, an interested party,60
including foreign and domestic producers, may request the ITA to conduct an annual
administrative review to recalculate the exact amount of antidumping duties.61 Five years
after an antidumping order is issued, the ITA and the ITC will initiate a mandatory
review of the order.62 In the meantime, foreign producers may challenge both the ITC and
the ITA’s final determinations before the Court of International Trade and subsequently
appeal to the Court of Appeals at the Federal Circuit and eventually to the Supreme
Court.63 However, the U.S. courts accord both the ITC and the ITA determinations great
deference under the Chevron doctrine.64

53

19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (concerning costs that are deducted to arrive at export price); 19 C.F.R. §
351.402.
54
19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (concerning a final determination by the International Trade Administration (ITA),
i.e., the Commerce Department).
55
19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (concerning the ITC final determination).
56
19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (concerning the issuance of the antidumping order by the ITA).
57
19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1) (concerning the assessment and the collection of antidumping duties by the
Customs Office).
58
19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (explaining the process and ability for revocation of an antidumping order subject to
a review under § 1675(b) or the revocation of a final determination of the amount of duties under §
1675(a).)
59
19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(4) (limiting review of the ITA and the ITC’s final determinations resulting in an
antidumping order).
60
19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (defining an “interested party”).
61
19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (periodically reviewing the amount of the antidumping duty).
62
19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (obligating the ITA and the ITC to review an antidumping order five years after
issuance).
63
The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). The Supreme Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to the U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, and reviews cases by granting a writ of
certiorari.
64
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). For an
example as applied in the antidumping context see Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec. v. Zenith v.
U.S., 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also Smith-Corona v. U.S., 713 F.2d 1568, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (according “tremendous deference to the expertise of the Secretary of Commerce in administering
the antidumping law”).
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B. Analyzing the Fallacy of the Unfair Trade Rationale
1. An Economic Analysis
Advocates for the antidumping regime, including the U.S. government, attempt
to cloak its protectionist nature in the unfair trade mantra. The alleged rationale of
antidumping remedies is based on a self-righteous notion of “fairness” which proponents
believe is achieved through a “level playing field” of their own reckoning.65 In other words,
these remedies are imposed on the assumption that foreign producers have engaged in
certain unfair practices without which they could not have produced such cheap products.
It is argued, therefore, that antidumping remedies should neutralize this unfair price
advantage by imposing duties at the border. The corollary of this position is that
producers who compete in the market, global or local, should be given identical conditions
for production, including socio-economic arrangements influenced by labor-management
and government-business relations. In this regard, the U.S. government contends that:
“A government’s industrial policies or key aspects of the economic system
supported by government inaction can enable injurious dumping to take place.
Although these policies take on many different forms, they can provide similar
artificial advantages to producers. For instance, these policies may allow
producers to earn high profits in a home "sanctuary market," which may in turn
allow them to sell abroad at an artificially low price. Such practices can result in
injury in the importing country since domestic firms may not be able to match the
artificially low prices from producers in the sanctuary market.” 66
Although this ostensibly clear-cut argument may appeal to ordinary people in its
most abstract terms, it is seriously flawed. First of all, one must not forget that the benefit
of trade stems from the fact that trading partners are different, not identical, in many ways,
such as their levels of development and natural endowment. This difference brings to
certain producers price competitiveness because they are capable of producing their
products more cheaply than their rivals. These superior conditions, collectively labeled as
“comparative advantage,” are the very engine of trade.67 Therefore, those conditions must
65

See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED THE DEVILISH DETAILS OF UNFAIR
TRADE LAW, xi (2003).
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United States Department of Commerce, Ensuring a Level Playing Field, available at
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openness are higher than others’ because our market is more open. We want foreign countries to come up
to our level, not to settle for the lowest common denominator.”).
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http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm.
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not be leveled and those cheap prices must not be neutralized or countervailed, if we truly
mean to engage in trade.68 In a broader sense, market economy forces dictate that
domestic industries losing their competitive edges should give their places in the market
to more efficient and innovative rivals, be they foreign or domestic. This is a fundamental
rule of market economy and should not be breached. And, perhaps more importantly, it is
fair. According to this rule, countless firms disappear and at the same time newly emerge
in this country. Consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole incessantly benefit from this
seemingly simple yet powerful process.
In addition, the “sanctuary market” argument employed by the U.S. government is
nothing but a façade legitimatization of the antidumping regime. The antidumping
advocates view is that dumpers can set lower prices in the exporting market than they do
in the domestic market only because they can assign lower cost, in a manipulative manner,
to export prices than they do to domestic prices.69 The antidumping advocates contend
that this manipulative allocation of cost is possible thanks to dumpers’ monopoly profits
in the sanctuary (home) market. Therefore, such cost structure is an outcome of
“subsidization” which is unjustified and thus should be countervailed by imposing
antidumping duties.70 However, this is a “fallacy of cost-plus pricing,” as John Barceló
aptly posited. If one duly takes into account the “demand” side in this picture, he or she
will soon realize that this cost allocation is nothing but a legitimate business practice.71 In
other words, to maximize his or her profits, a dumper must charge a lower price in the
more elastic foreign market and a higher price in the less elastic home market.72 There is
nothing unusual in this business practice.
In fact, those transactions described as dumping are occurring in the domestic
arena all the time.73 For instance, airplane companies routinely engage in price
differentiation through various discounts over the same quality of seats. A shirt’s price
can vary from points of sale, for example, from an outlet store to a department store.
Many stores undersell their rivals even below the cost level to secure certain market share.
Yet, these practices are all deemed legitimate as a profit-maximization strategy in the U.S.
in the absence of “predatory intention” as is stipulated in domestic statutes such as the
Robinson-Patman Act.74 In other words, domestic dumping practices are perfectly legal
unless dumpers intend to eventually drive out their rivals. Yet, a double-standard is
evident in cases where those rivals are foreign. Imported products which enjoy price
competitiveness, namely cheap goods, are often accused of being “dumped.”
68
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Without economic support for the “unfair trade” rationale, the motivation for
antidumping measures is left to protectionism. The unfair trade mantra, in fact, comes
from those interest groups seeking protection from foreign rivals.75 As Kenneth Dam
observed over three decades ago, “the concern with dumping is… a concern with the
protection of domestic industry from international competition.”76 More often than not,
such protectionist rationale is associated with a deprecatory image that the term “dump”
carries with it and even serves as xenophobic propaganda.77 By framing cheap imports as
fruits of illicit activities through complex arbitrary regulations, antidumping measures give
legal cover to the institutionalization of protectionism.78 Likewise, a bellicose myopia of
“us versus them,” as seen in the Cold War mentality, blinds both policy-makers and the
public from the important benefits of trade, including consumers’ welfare and efficient
allocation of resources rendered by cheap imports.79
Unsurprisingly, most mainstream economists and policymakers, including the
former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, recognize in unison that
antidumping measures are nothing but protectionism.80 Alan Deardorff observes that ever
since the classical study by Jacob Viner in the Twenties, economists have viewed dumping
as harmless without predatory, i.e., monopolistic, intent.81 A close scrutiny of a foreign
producers’ cost structure soon reveals that dumping, whether by price discrimination or
sales below cost, is in fact normal business behavior in the absence of any predatory
intent.82 In the case of price discrimination, if extra transaction costs accompanied by

75

Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1171
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foreign sales are not too high, the actual sale price in the foreign market may be lower
than in the home market.83 Also, firms often respond to market depression or pursue sale
maximization despite short-term loss of profits through sales below average or marginal
cost.84 As for predation, a foreign producers’ potential predatory intent to drive out
domestic rivals by underselling them, it is often inconceivable, perhaps “laughable,”
considering a foreign product’s share of the importing market is often insignificant.85 As a
matter of fact, even in the domestic setting “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful.”86 In conclusion, the economic rationale for antidumping
remedies rings false while the economic disincentives of protectionism, inefficiency and
costs to consumers ring clear.87
2. A Legal Analysis
Admittedly, low-priced foreign products are not, and should not be, always
immune from government restrictions or countermeasures even without predatory
behaviors. If an underlying production process at home involves any illicit or illegitimate
activities according to international trade law, or sometimes importing countries’ local
statutes, imports may be halted. If an import’s low prices are attributable to government
subsidies they may be banned or subjected to countervailing duties.88 Likewise, if low
prices are attributable to prison labor or piracy, the imports may be prohibited.89 If low
prices are the result of predation, i.e., deliberately aimed at driving out rivals in a given
market to enjoy a monopolistic position afterward, domestic antitrust statutes may
provide punitive measures.90 If low prices on imports are otherwise legal, but nevertheless
cause serious injury to domestic industries, an importing country’s government may still
rely on safeguard measures under certain conditions.91
However, the above-mentioned scenarios, apart from safeguards, are all tuned in
to the “legality” underlying production activities, not the impact imports have on rival
domestic producers. If these underlying production activities are illegal in the importing
country, for example production by prison labor, the importation of such products can be
banned regardless of their injurious effect to rival domestic industries. It is an established
jurisprudence that any violation of international trade rules ipso facto nullifies or impairs
Antidumping Laws in the GATT and the EC, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
296 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
83
Deardorff, supra note _, at 139.
84
Id. at 144-48.
85
Patrick Messerlin, The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal, 1980-85,
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 125, 563-87 (1989); Pierce, supra note _, at 733 (observing that in most
successful antidumping cases “none of the foreign producers accounts for a dominant share of the market”).
86
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 589 (1986).
87
Id. at 154.
88
Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note _, at 42-43
89
GATT Art. XX (e), (d) (general exception allowed for products of prison labor and piracy, respectively).
90
See supra notes 2 and 76.
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GATT Art. XIX(1)(b) (allowing emergency action on imports of particular products).
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the benefits of other trading partners.92 In other words, complaining parties need not
demonstrate injuries that violations under international trade law may have caused them
or their domestic industries. As a corollary, defending parties cannot escape their legal
responsibilities from those violations even if they generate no damages to other trading
partners. However, very few allegations of unfair or illegal practices leading to dumping
have ever been brought before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism or under the U.S.
domestic trade act, such as Section 301. These underlying practices are seldom
mentioned even in the USTR’s annual report on foreign trade barriers, the “National
Trade Estimates (NTE).”93
In stark contrast, antidumping laws predicate their foundation on the very
existence of “injuries.” If certain imports, no matter how unfair they may be, do not cause
injury or the threat of injury to domestic rivals the petition fails. In other words, the
existence of injuries is a litmus test for affording domestic producers protection. Only
after a preliminary injury determination does the DOC begin examining whether
dumping has really occurred and if so to what extent (the dumping margin).94 In nearly all
cases, antidumping investigations are initiated by petitions from domestic industries
which allege injury by unfair foreign imports.95
The protectionist attributes of the antidumping law can also be discovered in the
very structure of its process, which tends to burden and disadvantage the respondents.
The ITC’s affirmative preliminary injury determination triggers an issuance of long and
complicated questionnaires by the DOC to the “mandatory respondents,” who are major
foreign producers and at the same time market competitors of domestic producers.96 The
questionnaires are not voluntary surveys. Any omissions and insufficiencies will work
against the interests of foreign respondents because the DOC habitually relies on adverse
information provided by the petitioners, i.e., domestic producers, to fill in gaps. Such
information is euphemistically referred to as “facts available.”97 Therefore, foreign
respondents are forced to spend tremendous time, energy and money coping with this
trying bureaucratic burden from a foreign government.98
In sum, an antidumping regime is a legalistic reincarnation of protectionism. It
stigmatizes otherwise legitimate business practices under the label of “unfair trade,” and
based on such label it imposes penalties resembling the remedies available for the torts of
deceptive conduct or patent violations.99 Fair trade rhetoric serves as a façade
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legitimization which conceals the protectionist nature of antidumping duties.100 Once a
group of domestic producers feel threatened by cheap foreign imports they accuse foreign
producers of dumping and the ITC, in about 80% of all cases, issues an affirmative
preliminary ruling that dumped imports have caused or threaten to cause injury to the
petitioner.101
C. Detailing Protectionism: A Flawed Modus Operandi and Its Devilish Details
The nuts and bolts of the antidumping statute are numerous technicalities in both
calculating dumping margins and finding injuries. Although these mechanics, including
various means of analysis and computation, may appear at first glance methodical or even
scientific, they are so Byzantine and labyrinthine that they tend to repel any attempt to
comprehend them. Therefore, they constitute nearly a self-justifying system which is
vested with vast administrative discretion and immune to routine challenges from
outside.102 J. Michael Finger aptly observed that:
The mind’s eye can see a computer, programmed to run through the various
iterations of the ways in which dumping, injury, industry, and other technicalities of
a case might be specified. Having multiple ways to specify the technicalities mean
that there is always another combination to try each time the computer receives a
“No” response from the government; it just ticks over to the next iteration.103
Ironically, however, by scrutinizing these technicalities, which have been dubbed
the “devilish details,”104 one may unveil the antidumping regime’s deceitful fair trade
rhetoric and expose its substantive and procedural protectionism.105 If the “false veil of
unfairness loses its power to confuse or mislead,” the merits of antidumping remedies
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might be rethought.106 This will lead people to realize Mr. Hyde’s monstrosity hidden
behind Dr. Jekyll’s gentle face.107
1. Phantom Injuries
As discussed above, injuries caused by dumped imports are an essential element of
antidumping remedies. No matter how unfair or illegal a foreign import may be, it is off
the antidumping radar as long as it causes no injury to rival domestic industries. The
injury requirement is a logical corollary of the antidumping remedies’ rationale, i.e., to
protect “competitors” rather than “competition” itself.108 Therefore, antidumping
remedies focus not on objective injuries to competition, such as those from predatory
pricing, but on subjective injuries to domestic producers. The problem, however, is that
such subjective injuries may also come from normal (fair) competition, not necessarily
from the alleged unfair trade.109 Nonetheless, the competitor-oriented antidumping
statutes make it easier for the domestic antidumping authority, such as the ITC, to find
injuries even when such injuries are unreal because they are not directly connected to the
alleged dumping.110
Two conditions should be met to locate an injury under a given situation: scope
(injury to whom) and extent (how much injury). The U.S. antidumping statute stipulates
that an injury caused by dumped imports should be attributed to those domestic
industries which produce “like products” of the dumped imports.111 Therefore, a domestic
salt producer may not claim injury caused by an allegedly dumped sugar import. In
addition, such injury should be more than de minimis, i.e., “material,” which is
consequential and important.112 However, these two parameters are inherently ambiguous,
leaving the ITC enormous discretion which may be hijacked for protectionist purposes.113
Below is an illustrative list of phantom injuries.
First, no standardized test exists to determine whether foreign imports, which are
a target of an antidumping investigation, and domestic products whose producers launch
an antidumping petition against those imports, are like products. Petitioners can freely
square the circle of such likeness in a way which best serves their protectionist purpose.
Likewise, there is no objective likeness test, which makes the ITC’s injury test inevitably
106
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arbitrary and leads to incongruous results. For example, although galvanized carbon steel
sheeting is not like ungalvanized carbon steel sheeting, galvanized carbon steel wire nails
are like ungalvanized carbon steel wire nails.114 In addition, petitioners tend to narrowly
define the affected market, and thus industry, to aggrandize the injuries.115 For example,
when the same imported goods are both marketed as a final product in the merchant
market and used to produce other downstream products (captive production), petitioners
will only focus on the merchant market sales in the antidumping petition to raise their
odds for success.116
Second, a more serious problem lies in the lax, or often lacking, analysis on
“causation” between dumping and alleged injury.117 Astoundingly, the injury need not be
actually “caused” by dumping: it only needs to be “by reason of” dumping.118 This nearly
non-existent causation requirement is a true blessing to petitioners, which need not
demonstrate that dumping is the “sole or even primary” cause of injury.119 Therefore, even
if a domestic industry’s injury or loss of profit result mainly from consumers’ changed
habits or severe competition among domestic producers,120 the industry can easily raise its
fingers to foreign producers and associate its injury with their alleged dumping.121 Under
this lax causation standard, the majority of ITC commissioners does not use any
economic analysis, but instead rely on a gut test in determining the existence of injury in
specific cases.122 For example, an increase of imports for three years in a row will be
viewed by commissioners as an evidence of a causal relation between imports and
injuries.123
Third, even in the absence of actual material injury petitioners can initiate an
antidumping investigation and obtain a protective action by demonstrating a mere
“threat” of injury.124 This inherently inferential concept requires the ITC’s
“prognostication” and thus attracts protectionist abuse by petitioners.125 Under this threat
of injury, any foreign imports can be subject to a potential trade restriction even before
114
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they are shipped to the U.S. market. Understandably, petitioners usually, almost in a
default fashion, include this threat claim in their petitions.
Fourth, injuries can be accumulated from multiple sources (countries) in order to
bestow on domestic industries a maximum level of protection. As a result, even smallscale exporters can be determined to dump after their products are lumped together with
those of other producers in the dumping investigation.126 This cumulation practice seems
to be unfair to these small-scale producers in that they are penalized as dumpers even if
their exports alone would not cause any damages to domestic rivals.
Fifth, a “regrettable change” has been made during the Uruguay Round
negotiation and enshrined as Article 3.4 of the WTO AD Agreement. The Article
mandates the ITC to consider the “magnitude of the margin of dumping” in its injury
determination, which makes the ITC more likely to find injuries when the Commerce
Department has come up with a large dumping margin.127
In sum, these lax injury standards offer the ITC various routes to locate phantom
injuries. Unsurprisingly, most domestic industries competing with alleged dumped imports
are not truly injured by unfair imports. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) economists
Morris E. Morkre and Kenneth H. Kelly demonstrated that out of 179 cases decided by
the ITC from 1980 through 1988 only 21 cases involved revenue losses greater than 10
percent.128
2. Phantom Prices
In addition to injury, an importing government should find the existence of
dumping before imposing antidumping duties on imported products. While the ITC
determines the existence of injury, the ITA within the DOC investigates and decides
whether foreign producers sold their products in the U.S. market at less than fair value
(LTFV), i.e., dumped, in the U.S. market and if so, to what extent.129 To determine the
existence of dumping and its magnitude logically requires two “prices” to be compared.
The first price, which is labeled “normal value (NV),” is a normative, fair price which
should have been set in the home (exporting) market without any alleged unfair
governmental intervention or other such practices.130 The other price, which is labeled
126
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“export price” (EP), is the actual price offered in the importing country’s domestic market,
which is the U.S.131 The difference between these two prices constitutes the dumping
margin.
The problem is that prices are always fluctuating, which complicates the
determination on price discrimination, i.e., dumping. The concept of normal value itself
sounds somewhat oxymoronic in the free market system because prices constantly rise
and fall according to the force of supply and demand. This situation makes it hard to fix a
price for a normative reason. Moreover, most antidumping cases, at least in the U.S.,
concern the situation in which the same products as imports are not sold in the exporting
countries (developing countries).132
In other words, there exists no “sanctuary market” in the exporting country where
government favoritism or intervention unduly creates price differences.133 Accordingly,
common sense dictates that there should be no “comparison” at all for the sake of
determining the existence of dumping and its margin because one of two subjects for
comparison does not exist. Nonetheless, the antidumping regime’s protectionist mission
still forces the DOC to locate the “next most similar” products.134 At this stage, the
DOC’s own logic and philosophy replaces common sense. The DOC uses its self-designed
product code, coined “CONNUM,” which categorizes distinctive characteristics or
properties of each given product, such as rubber or plastic and small or big, and conducts
the so-called “model matching”135 to obtain two entities to be compared.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the DOC can come up with two matching models
to be compared, obtaining their prices requires yet another layer of fiction. As discussed
above, actual market prices are hard to fix. Prices can be individual, specific or averaged.
Prices of today can be different from those of yesterday. You can pay lot less for the same
product in an outlet mall compared to a department store. Products are often on sale for
various reasons. Therefore, in order to obtain prices to determine the existence of
dumping and the dumping margin, the DOC conducts a “dizzying variety of
adjustments.”136 The basic methodology is to strip final sale prices of all post-production
expenses to acquire the so-called “ex-factory” prices. These post-production expenses
include various discounts/rebates, transportation/advertisement cost and other
direct/indirect selling expenses.137
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Although the use of these ex-factory prices aims for an equi-dimensional, i.e.,
“apples-to-apples” comparison, a combination of factors, including the above-mentioned
fictitious “model matching” practice, the inherent multiplicity of prices, and finally the
DOC’s unrestricted discretion in the price adjustment process, tend to entail preposterous
“apples-to-oranges” comparisons.138 For example, when the DOC compares the U.S. sale
prices with third-country sale prices when an investigated product is not sold in the home
market, a dumping margin may easily be found solely on the ground that the thirdcountry prices become higher due to the third country’s invisible trade barriers, which has
nothing to do unfair practices by the accused dumper.139
This arbitrariness in legislating prices culminates in the situation where the DOC
“constructs” prices.140 Under certain circumstances in which either the model matching or
third-party product comparison does not work and the DOC designates an exporting
country as a non-market economy (NME), the DOC itself computes, but more accurately
legislates, archetypal prices to be used in determining the existence of dumping and the
dumping margin.141 Here, the DOC wields enormous discretion in assigning all relevant
costs for production, ranging from raw material, labor and capital, as well as producers’
profits.142 No doubt, such construction is biased towards findings of dumping. In many
situations the DOC relies on information and data provided by no one but petitioners in
the name of “facts available.”143 In addition, the profit rates that the DOC adopts in the
construction of prices are often higher than in reality.144
In sum, even if one supposes arguendo that dumping in the form of price
discrimination is a condemnable practice, the euphemistic process of “fair market
comparison” to determine the existence of such dumping is not in fact fair at all. Both
foreign and domestic prices in the comparison are unobtainable, and are either
manipulated or constructed. Lindsey and Ikenson observed that:
In the typical antidumping investigation, the DOC compares home-market and
U.S. prices of physically different goods, in different kinds of packaging, sold at
353.41(d)(1)(iii) (1995) (regarding the addition of sales taxes to the U.S. price); 19 U.S.C. §
1677a(c)(2)(A) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(2)(i) (1995) (regarding the addition of export costs such as
freight charges, insurance premiums, import duties, and warehouse expenses to the U.S. price); 19 C.F.R. §
353.57(a) (1995) (regarding the difference in merchandise (DIFMER) adjustment over the home market
price).; 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1995) (regarding the level of trade (LOT) adjustment over the home market
price); 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a) (1995) (regarding the circumstances of sale (COS) adjustment over the home
market price).
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different times, in different and fluctuating currencies, to different customers at
different levels of trade, in different quantities, with different freight and other
movement costs, different credit terms, and other differences in directly associated
selling experiences (e.g., commissions, warranties, royalties, and advertising). Is it
any wonder that the prices aren’t identical?145
On top of these structural problems, numerous bureaucratic technicalities
employed by the DOC contribute to an affirmative finding of dumping by making home
market value (normal value) higher and/or the U.S. market value (export price) lower.
First of all, the DOC excludes most sales by domestic producers made at prices below the
production cost (“below-cost” sales) in calculating normal value.146 Such practice makes it
easier to find dumping by ultimately exaggerating normal value, especially considering the
fact that below-cost sales are not subtracted in calculating the U.S. home price unless
such sales constitute at least 20 percent of total sales.147
However, this special treatment of “below-cost” sales as something in the
extraordinary course of trade is without any economic rationale because, as discussed
above,148 firms often engage in sales at a loss for a variety of legitimate reasons, such as
launching their products in a new market. This below-cost production makes perfect
economic sense if one takes a closer look at firms’ cost structure, especially the fact that
what often matters in a firm’s decision-making is “variable,” not “total” cost of
production.149 In the absence of evidence that these firms aim for predatory pricing, the
practice of below-cost sales must be allowed in the same fashion that airplane companies
often undersell each other. Even more problematic is that the power to decide whether to
disregard below-cost sales in calculating normal value is at the total discretion of the
DOC.150
Second, because the antidumping remedy is based on an aggregate, collective
notion of injuries to domestic industries fair market comparison requires summing up
each dumping margin separately calculated from sales in each different category (model
or type) of the same product. Therefore, if such comparison is really fair, any possible
negative dumping margins in some categories, which indicates that the U.S. market price
is higher than the home market price, should be allowed to offset other positive dumping
margins from other categories. However, under a well-established and even judicially
endorsed practice151 labeled “zeroing,” the DOC disallows such offsetting by zeroing any
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negative dumping margins.152 The zeroing practice tends to inflate the actual impact of
dumping. Likewise, non-dumped sales in the U.S. market do not offset dumped ones,
thereby increasing the possibility of the DOC’s finding dumping.153
Third, any fair market comparison should maintain methodological coherence in
calculations between the home market and the U.S. price. Therefore, “average” home
market prices should be compared with “average” U.S. prices, and “individual” home
market prices “individual” U.S. prices. However, the DOC often makes another deviation
from this normative track and compares “average” home market prices with “individual”
U.S. prices. Therefore, even if “average” U.S. prices exceed “average” home market prices
and no dumping exists, the DOC still creates dumping margins by selecting a couple of
low-priced anecdotal transactions in the U.S.154 This scenario is most likely under an
administrative review in which the DOC determines whether it maintains or terminates
its pre-existing antidumping order because averaging is not adopted in the administrative
review.155 The bottom line is that the DOC can, and will, arrive at a finding that dumping
has occurred one way or another, if it so desires.
All in all, the classic theory of justice, articulated by Aristotle, dictates that equals
should be treated equally and unequals unequally.156 Yet, a premise logically superseding
this heuristic is that one should be able to determine whether the two subjects in question
are equal or unequal before conferring on them equal or unequal treatment. If one
attempts to square an unequal to an equal, any subsequent treatment based on this flawed
designation is pre-ordained to be unjust. In other words, certain situations do not even
warrant a comparison between what is to be compared. The fundamental defect of the
antidumping regime originates from its brazen comparison of what should not be
compared. This flaw, or bias, explains an astonishingly high affirmative determination rate
against foreign producers by the DOC over alleged foreign dumping practices.157
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3. Procedural Burdens and Injustice
The investigatory process of antidumping is inherently biased against respondents
(foreign producers) in the sense that petitioners (domestic producers) are teamed up with
the antidumping authorities (DOC and ITC) throughout the investigatory process.
Therefore, impartiality or other due process values, which are the backbone of any quasiadjudicatory or adjudicatory proceeding, cannot be anticipated from the antidumping
authorities. For example, unlike in a normal litigation setting, petitioners in an
antidumping proceeding are free from heavy burdens of discovery since the antidumping
authorities perform an investigation by themselves.158 Antidumping authorities even work
with petitioners before they initiate their petition to ensure that the petition is “legally
sufficient.”159
In addition, due process and other procedural safeguards cannot be fully
implemented in an antidumping proceeding. The Administrative Procedural Act (APA)
does not apply to an antidumping suit.160 Also, the whole investigatory process is subject
to a strict timetable,161 which tends to militate against the interests of foreign respondents
because tight deadlines deprive them of adequate time to defend their cases. For example,
foreign respondents have only 45 days to respond to the DOC’s questionnaire.162 In order
to fully respond to such questionnaire foreign respondents need lawyers, economists,
accountants, and translators.163
Therefore, the responding process costs respondents a vast amount of time, money
and energy. If the respondent ever lapses on the aforementioned deadline, the DOC will
use data provided by petitioners, which is predictably self-serving and adverse to the
interests of foreign producers. This petitioner produced data is labeled “best information
available.”164 Even if domestic industries fail to prevail in the first round of an
antidumping complaint, they can re-try with new filings over the same subject-matter
because the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel does not apply to the
antidumping proceeding unlike other civil procedures.165
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This “procedural protectionism”166 results from a captured trade policy under
which domestic interest groups persuade the U.S. Congress to change various procedures,
such as time limits or deadlines, to the detriment of foreign rivals.167 Capitalizing on these
time limits, antidumping petitioners often “overload” the system by filing loads of cases
beyond the government’s capacity in a hope that the government is forced to broker
settlements, such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), between petitioners and foreign
producers, rather than determining on the merits of the cases.168
This procedural injustice, which is potential harassment to foreign producers,
severely distorts trade flows and often forces them to raise export prices to avoid
antidumping investigations. In other words, a mere threat of filing antidumping petitions
or initiating antidumping investigations may suffice to chill foreign producers’ entry or
force cooperation with domestic producers on pricing, even in the absence actually
imposed antidumping duties. In fact, this threat is very effective in forming a cartel: while
petitioners can abuse the antidumping proceeding with very little cost, the
anticompetitive damages to consumers and the entire economy are “significant and
durable.”169
Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak empirically proved the occurrence of these trade
distortions before the final determination of dumping and injury via the presence of
pending investigations ( the “investigation effect”) and the suspension of investigations in
exchange for foreign producers’ commitment to raise export prices (the “suspension
effect”).170 Therefore, by filing antidumping petitions domestic producers may attempt to
merely harass foreign producers with a view to wringing cooperation from the latter
(“process filers”), rather than targeting for the imposition of final duties (“outcome
filers”).171
Shi Young Lee and Sung Hee Jun also demonstrated this investigation effect, yet
in a more dynamic fashion. First, they show that a petitioner’s mere initiation of an
antidumping complaint can increase the uncertainty for the “trade prospects” as to
targeted products since an importer might be forced to pay antidumping duties in the
future.172 These additional transaction costs created by uncertainty tend to drive the
export production to other non-petitioned foreign producers (“first order investigation
166
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effect”).173 Yet, news of the petition will soon reach non-petitioned foreign producers who
export competitive or substitutable products. Even though these non-targeted foreign
producers are not directly affected by the petition, they nonetheless tend to fear any
possible future petitions toward themselves.174 Their fear may be explained by a social
psychology phenomenon called “priming effects” under which the salience of the previous
event (the original initiation) influences, i.e., primes, the perception of risks by nontargeted foreign producers.175 Therefore, even non-targeted firms tend to reduce their
exports or raise their prices to avoid any possible antidumping attacks in the future. This
is called the “second order investigation effect”.176
In sum, the antidumping mechanism inflicts high costs, and in particular
uncertainty, on foreign exporters throughout its investigatory process.177 It also tends to
convert the U.S. adversarial system of justice into an inquisitorial one which is biased
against respondents (foreign producers).178 As Frederick Davis avowed forty years ago,
this area of law in many aspects contravenes basic tenets of law, such as due process and
equal protection, which are so assiduously respected in other areas of public law.179
Without a political check on this administrative abuse, the antidumping remedy cannot
be but yet another maltreatment of foreign producers.180

II. Two Failures of the Antidumping Regime
A. Economic Factionism: A Madisonian Failure
James Madison began the Federalist Paper No. 10 by submitting that
“[A]mong the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control
the violence of faction.”181
Antidumping remedies are the very evil that Madison so passionately preached
against. Without any true foundation for their ostensible “fair trade” rationale, as
discussed above, antidumping remedies have become “little more than an excuse for
173
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special interests to shield themselves from competition at the expense of both American
consumers and other American companies.”182 Through antidumping measures, federal
economic welfare is hijacked by a handful of special interests, which can be depicted as
economic “factions.” 183 Therefore, antidumping remedies precipitate a Madisonian failure
by the government.184
Unbeknownst, American consumers are forced to pay higher prices for their
everyday purchases, including candles, shrimp and computers, due to additional
antidumping duties, while such overpayment enriches only a small group of producers
which are losing competitive edges but are nonetheless protected by these trade remedies.
This “protection tax”185 has inflicted upon the U.S. economy massive economic damages.
Raj Bhala pointed to the ITC’s candid analysis on the antidumping regime’s negative
effect on the welfare of the U.S. economy.186 The ITC estimated that outstanding
antidumping and countervailing duty orders as of 1991 deprived the U.S. economy of
about $ 1.6 billion. Furthermore, the burden falls disproportionately onto the poor
because targeted consumer goods are often necessities which tend to constitute a bigger
portion of their spending than the rich.187
Economic harms inflicted by antidumping remedies are also felt by American
companies as well as their workers. Because most antidumping tariffs are imposed on parts
and intermediary goods which are used to produce other goods, producers of these final
goods (the so-called “downstream” firms), such as automobile companies, face steeper
costs.188 For example, even if automakers no longer use imported steel, they still have to
pay higher steel prices because domestic steel prices have soared as a result of
antidumping measures.189 As a result, each steel job saved by these antidumping tariffs
costs an estimated three jobs in steel-consuming industries.190 For the same reason, in the
early 1990’s Toshiba closed its California laptop factories and moved to Japan after the
62.7% antidumping tariffs were imposed on flat-panel displays.191 All in all, the
182
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antidumping remedy “imposes disparate transaction costs” on parties concerned, resulting
in a failure to achieve an optimal level of resource allocation in the national economy.192
Furthermore, the remedial (protectionist) effect of antidumping measures may be
questionable even to their ostensible beneficiaries. While antidumping measures may
allow inefficient firms to sustain themselves temporarily, they tend to eventually harm
those firms in the long run.193 Antidumping measures send the wrong signals to the firms’
shareholders and employees, depriving them of any entrepreneurial efforts such as
restructuring. Moreover, protectionism sustained by antidumping remedies appears quite
addictive.194 Once in place, antidumping measures are hard to revoke, despite statutory
possibilities under a “sunset review” conducted every five years.195 The DOC repealed
antidumping tariffs in only two of the 314 cases which it examined under the sunset
review between 1998 and 2000.196 Therefore, as of December 1999 Chinese “cotton shop
towels” and Japanese “television receivers” had continuously been subject to an
antidumping order ever since October 1983 and March 1971, respectively.197 The U.S.
trade law was amended during the 1970s and 1980s to make it easier to find dumping by
adding special rules such as the exclusion of below-cost sales and the use of constructed
value, etc.198
The foregoing self-reinforcing propensity of antidumping remedies has recently
culminated in the “United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA)
of 2000,”199 which is often referred to as the “Byrd Amendment” after its chief architect,
Senator Robert Byrd. The Byrd Amendment mandates the U.S. government to disperse
antidumping duties to none but antidumping petitioners on an annual basis.200
Unsurprisingly, this extraordinary financial incentive has dramatically boosted
antidumping petitions ever since its enactment.201 Even some government agencies have
warned against the devastating economic effects that the Byrd Amendment has caused to
the U.S economy. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has recently stated that:
192
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The law subsidizes the output of some firms at the expense of others, leading to
inefficient use of capital, labor, and other resources of the economy. It discourages
settlement of cases by U.S. firms and will lead to increased expenditure of
economic resources on administration, legal representation of parties, and various
other costs associated with the operation of the antidumping and countervailingduty laws.202
Although this law has already been struck down as an illegal extension of
antidumping measures by the WTO,203 it is not likely to be repealed in the near future
considering its unusual popularity in Capitol Hill.204 It is reported that seven of the nine
newly elected senators officially supported the Byrd Amendment in February 2005.205 The
U.S. economy will soon suffer further if U.S. trading partners decide to retaliate against
U.S. exports because of the U.S.’s non-compliance with the WTO decision.206 This
reciprocation reveals another, much broader, negative ramification of antidumping
remedies to the U.S. economy. As long as the U.S. uses antidumping remedies as its
protectionist weapon, its trading partners will follow suit and plague U.S. exporters with
their own antidumping investigations and duties.207 In sum, antidumping remedies leave
the U.S. with many self-inflicted wounds.
B. Cartelization: An Antitrust Failure
In addition to the foregoing parochialistic consequences, antidumping remedies
tend to cause an antitrust breakdown by creating oligopolistic pricing patterns. The
purpose of the antidumping regime is to discourage imports from being priced lower than
their rival domestic products. Hence, pro-competitive pricing strategies by importers, such
as “low introductory prices” or “experimental prices,” are deterred.208 Without this price
competition, domestic prices remain stable, i.e., fixed, to the detriment of consumers and
consuming industries, while such fixed prices serve the narrow interests of a handful of
oligopolistic domestic producers.209
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This anti-competitive effect, i.e., price-fixing, of antidumping remedies, can be
easily located in the very concept of “dumping margins” which as a remedial criterion
eventually determine the amount of duties foreign producers are forced to pay for their
alleged dumping. These extra duties tend to increase domestic sale prices which would
have otherwise been low. In addition, if those foreign producers decide to leave the
domestic market as a result of such penalizing antidumping duties, petitioners, i.e.,
domestic competitors, can enjoy their pre-existing price levels which are higher than what
they would have been without the existence of antidumping duties.
Therefore, the antidumping statute promotes a “legal cartel” in which the
government itself monitors and enforces a price-fixing scheme for the benefit of domestic
industries and to the detriment of domestic consumers.210 Under this legal cartel, the
mere act of filing an antidumping petition may induce effective cooperation in pricefixing among domestic and foreign producers.211 Antidumping petitions targeting
imported products are usually filed jointly by a certain critical mass of domestic producers
producing similar goods.212 In this joint effort to launch an antidumping complaint,
domestic producers naturally exchange information on prices and output levels of their
products. Such communication may be the onset of a price-fixing conspiracy. Recent
oligopolistic behaviors, such as “price leadership” by big companies and “open pricing”
through trade associations,213 also facilitate such collusive communication. Under these
circumstances, domestic producers can comfortably engage in the so-called “conscious
parallelism” in which they can effectively coordinate their price and output decisions even
in the absence of overt illegal collusion.214
However, cartelization through an antidumping petition does not remain purely a
domestic phenomenon. The prototypical collusion toward a price-fixing cartel among
antidumping petitioners may soon expand to foreign producers who produce identical or
similar products. The message is blunt: If you raise your prices to a level with which we
feel comfortable, we will withdraw the antidumping petition.215 Economists have long
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suspected collusions among domestic and foreign producers when the former withdraw
their antidumping petitions after out-of-court settlements with the latter.216 Likewise, to
terminate antidumping investigations against them, foreign producers are often forced to
conclude “price undertaking” or “suspension agreements,” the economic effect of which is
price-fixing.
Why do foreign producers feel powerless when domestic producers file
antidumping petitions and why are they willing to settle rather than respond to dumping
allegations and comply with the ensuing investigations? An answer to this question may
be found in the U.S. District Court’s opinion in Music Center:
These proceedings may pose a substantial burden on their target. The foreign
companies who are the subject of an antidumping investigation are presented with
questionnaires seeking information about their selling practices, and, in many
cases, their cost of production as well. After submission of questionnaire responses,
these responses are verified by Commerce officials. The verification process
sometimes involves up to five investigators reviewing source documents at the
respondents’ corporate offices and factories for periods ranging between three days
and three weeks.217
In particular, small foreign companies as respondents often cannot afford lawyers,
accountants and economists which are necessary to fully respond to the DOC’s
investigation, while the well-monied petitioners can.218 The obverse side of this story is
that domestic industries may be willing to spend a handsome amount of money in an
antidumping suit against small foreign producers in order to harass these foreign
producers out of the domestic market. This behavior, which is called a “non-price
predation,” aims to raise competitors’ cost through specious litigations.219
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Non-price predation may be a superior alternative to price predation for big
domestic producers in many aspects. For example, the former is less expensive than the
latter since joint petitioners can share the legal cost among themselves. In addition, price
predation, while its costs are certain, cannot guarantee recoupment of these costs despite
a monopoly because there is always the possibility of new entries to the market.220
Moreover, in the antidumping context, petitioners can rely on the government to absorb
most costs through statutory proceedings.221 The DOC’s own practice of not screening
spurious petitions in the filing stage contributes to the potential proliferation of non-price
predation in antidumping proceedings.222 “[V]ery little (if any) predation is accomplished
through pricing, while a good deal is achieved through litigation.”223
The pain inflicted by this non-price predation on foreign producers is so grave that
they tend to react even to a mere “threat” of an antidumping suit.224 In other words, even
without actual antidumping petitions a mere prospect, or threat thereof, sensitizes foreign
producers in their pricing behaviors, forcing these producers to put higher price tags on
their exports to avoid any potential antidumping attacks. This tacit communication can
lead to an effective price-fixing.225 Moreover, domestic industries lobby the government to
establish the euphemistically labeled VERs, which are nothing but cartels,226 with foreign
countries participating under the implied threat of antidumping remedies.227
Some of the most pre-eminent antitrust scholars in the nation have illustrated the
foregoing forced participation in the cartelization by foreign producers under the
government fiat or under the shadow of antidumping threat by domestic producers.
Frederick Scherer highlighted how the government contributed to a cartelization through
antidumping proceedings.228 Two New Mexico potash (potassium) producers filed an
antidumping suit against Canadian potash producers, in particular the Potash
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Corporation of Saskatchewan (PCS), on February 10, 1987. Followed by the ITC’s
preliminary injury determination on March 23, 1987, the DOC announced preliminary
dumping margins of 52% against the PCS.
The PCS was then required to post huge bonds on future exports covering duties
tantamount to these preliminary dumping margins. The PCS was soon forced to increase
its export price on potash in an attempt to reduce final dumping margins and to pay the
bonds to be posted. Other Canadian producers followed suit, and potash prices spiked.
Finally, Canadian potash producers concluded a “suspension agreement” with the U.S.
government under which they agreed to fix their export prices to the titular “fair market
value” for the next five years. Yet, this price hike (nearly 100%) precipitated by an
antidumping suit continued throughout the 1990’s, demonstrating the classic
phenomenon of cartel-driven price-fixing. The government’s enforcement of price-fixing
through the antidumping process made this cartel legal.
Richard Pierce introduced a case in point which vividly demonstrated how the
“threat” of an antidumping suit may be used to compel foreign producers to join a preexisting price-fixing cartel.229 In 1989, the U.S. ferrosilicon producers, who tried to form a
price-fixing cartel, faced an obstacle from cheap imports by foreign producers from China,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela. In an attempt to eliminate those five noncartel members from the U.S. market, the U.S. producers filed antidumping complaints
against them and soon succeeded in preventing foreign producers from those five
countries from competing with the U.S. cartel members. Yet, their cartelization soon
faced another obstacle. In the early 1990’s, Brazilian producers of ferrosilicon began to
approach the U.S. market. This time, the U.S. producers invited Brazilian producers to
join the cartel under the threat of another antidumping suit.
However, Brazilian producers declined this offer, and the U.S. cartel members
executed their threat by successfully filing antidumping complaints against Brazilian
ferrosilicon producers. These wrongly imposed antidumping remedies were revoked only
after this cartel was revealed by a whistleblower. This case eloquently describes how
effortlessly domestic producers may abuse the antidumping proceeding for
anticompetitive purposes and how greatly the antidumping remedies may contribute to
the solidification of a pre-existing cartel. Perhaps this may explain why big steel
companies such as Bethlehem Steel and LTV Steel dominate antidumping petitions in
the U.S. concerning steel.230 Considering a high success ratio of antidumping suit,231 such
dominance by big corporations in antidumping petitions tends to oust relatively small
foreign rivals.
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In sum, antidumping actions facilitate cartelization. Without antidumping actions,
“it is difficult to create, maintain, and enforce a price-fixing cartel.”232 Thanks to a
statutorily stipulated antidumping proceeding, which creates a legal cartel, domestic
industries can either deter non-cartel members from advancing on the cartelized market
or force them to join the cartel.233 Since a petition for an antidumping investigation
should be filed by a representative number of companies producing like products, these
companies tend to discuss among themselves the prices and costs of foreign competitors
whose low prices threaten their own market shares.

III. Remedying Trade Remedies: Options and Obstacles
A. Repealing or Revising the Antidumping Statute?
Confronting the aforementioned flaws and damages, a camp of scholars, lawyers
and economists argue that the current antidumping statute should be repealed234 and/or
replaced other by antitrust regulations.235 Yet, these options tend to suffer from either
political infeasibility or lack reform value. First, if the antidumping statute is truly to
protect domestic industries from any unfair foreign trade practices involving a restraint on
trade or other monopolistic behaviors, antitrust statutes, such as the Robinson-Patman
Act,236 should apply to discipline anticompetitive behavior. Under these circumstances,
however, domestic petitioners have to prove foreign dumpers’ “predatory intent,” which is
a tremendously burdensome process, and they would certainly disfavor such an option as
sharply decreasing their chances for legal protection against foreign competition.237
Domestic industries, which are accustomed to a nearly automatic protection under
antidumping remedies without the burden of proving predatory intent, would not support
a legislative change fatal to their interests.
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Others argue that the antidumping statute should be replaced by the current
safeguard measures under Section 201. However, Section 201, as an exceptional trade
remedy, requires a higher threshold in demonstrating injuries to domestic producers,
serious injuries, as opposed to the antidumping measures’ material injuries.238 This more
cumbersome injury standard tends to make legislators shun the proposal. Some observers
suggest using the material injury standard found in the antidumping statute for safeguard
measures.239 However, this would be tantamount to merely changing the name of
antidumping remedies to safeguard measures without a substantial redress of the
antidumping remedies’ negative effects.
A more modest option may be to insert the “public interest” clause in the current
antidumping statute, as is the case in Australia and the European Community (EC).240
The main idea behind the clause is to take into account negative economic consequences
of antidumping duties to consumers and consuming industries vis-à-vis remedial effects to
petitioners based on their injuries.241 However, this clause seems to have exerted little
impact in practice both in Australia and the EC. Antidumping authorities have seldom
revoked their final dumping or injury determinations in the name of public interest once
they discovered the existence of dumping and injury.242
This refusal to revoke determinations may be attributed to two factors. First,
unlike antitrust authorities, antidumping authorities are not well positioned to weigh in
the negative effects of antidumping remedies to consumers and consuming industries,
which is a critical component of the public interest test.243 Second, those negatively
affected parties, such as consumers, often lack significant access to the investigatory
process: they often have no legal standing in the process.244 In addition, to introduce the
public interest clause in the current U.S. antidumping statute appears politically infeasible
considering the protectionist bias in Congress which has reinforced, through a series of
amendments, the antidumping statutes and regulations.245 Even if such clause is
established, its practical value may be questionable without additional procedural
arrangements being contemplated to ensure its effectiveness.
In sum, repealing or revising the current antidumping statute appears politically
infeasible considering strong protectionist support within Congress.
Trade Act of 1974 as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1988) (allowing action by the executive if foreign
imports invade the market in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury).
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B. Antitrust Options: FTC’s Intervention in the Antidumping Proceeding
1. A Case for the FTC’s Intervention
If the case of repealing or revising the antidumping statute is politically or
practically infeasible, one reasonable alternative may be to check and discipline the
antidumping proceeding under antitrust rules. In particular, the FTC, with its unique
constitutional stature as the fourth branch guardian of competition, can play a vital role in
cabining anti-competitive aspects of the antidumping proceeding. As the Former FTC
Chairman Daniel Oliver noted, Congress certainly gave the FTC responsibilities relating
to international trade in addition to domestic commerce when it created the Commission
in 1914.246
As discussed above, the anticompetitive nature of the antidumping statute is
revealed by its lack of consideration of consumers’ welfare. Captured by domestic
producers’ protectionist aspirations, the antidumping statute disregards consumers’
injuries (high prices) while sympathizing with injuries to domestic industries. High
domestic prices are the consequence of the price-fixing mechanism which is the gestalt of
the antidumping regime. A mere threat of an antidumping suit by big domestic producers
is enough to chill small foreign producers and force them to raise export prices.247 In the
end, antidumping duties imposed by the Customs Office on imports are often transferred
to consumers in the form of increased retail prices.
Unfortunately, however, the three traditional branches of the government seem to
have been largely ineffective in tackling the anticompetitive effects of the antidumping
statute mainly because these braches themselves are involved in creating and preserving
price-fixing cartels. The legislature passed the antidumping statute and has reinforced it
through a series of amendments,248 while the executive branch through the DOC has
implemented the statute in a way which represents the interests of domestic producers.249
Furthermore, the role of the Judiciary in sustaining legal cartels has been most
conspicuous.
The Judiciary protects antidumping petitions and remedies by according a broad
amount of deference over issues of fact and law to antidumping authorities, such as the
DOC and the ITC, under the Chevron doctrine.250 It seems nearly paradoxical that the
246
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court gives a free hand to those agencies which are in fact vulnerable to capture by special
interest groups.251 For example, the DOC’s calculations and determinations on dumping
margins are highly motivated by the inputs of domestic industries which the DOC exists
to serve. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the DOC tends to find
dumping margins in most cases.252
Even if the ITC were to come up with certain innovative pro-competitive
interpretations of the law, the courts are unlikely to subscribe to them because it has no
option but to follow the protectionist legislative intent of antidumping statutes. For
example, in Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, one Commissioner proposed to limit the
injury determinations to predatory pricing type dumping cases, i.e., below-cost foreign
sales.253 This proposal featured a five-factor test which focused on the “intent and cost
structure” of foreign producers to evaluate the degree of their anti-competitive behaviors
in the domestic market.254 However, in USX Corp. v. United States, the court rejected this
narrow interpretation in that this approach was inconsistent with the antidumping statute
which permits a broader range of dumping.255 After all, the court should conduct the
injury test “from the standpoint of U.S. producers.”256
Facing these protectionist biases manifested in the three branches’ dealings with
the antidumping remedies, an innovative response must be contemplated beyond
conventional institutional parameters. It is at this juncture that the distinctive function of
the FTC should be spotlighted. As the titular fourth branch, the FTC should counteract
the three branches’ troubling trade-restraining practices which are to the detriment of
consumers and competition.257 In particular, the very existence of these “public restraints”
and their “long-lasting public harms,” which are created and maintained by legal cartels
under the antidumping regime, not only justifies but also requires the FTC’s intervention
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in the antidumping matter as a guardian of market competition.258 It is well known that
the public restraints imposed by a legal cartel tend to be more fatal to competition than
private cartels since they block a competitor’s new entry to the market more effectively.259
Admittedly, the FTC alone could not invalidate the whole antidumping regime
despite its anti-competitive attributes as long as a cartel remains legal. Nonetheless, the
FTC can still expose the trade-restraining nature in procedural aspects of the
antidumping regime and limit abuses by domestic producers in a way which minimizes
potential harms to the market competition.260
2. Modalities of FTC Intervention
a. Administrative Adjudication
The FTC can initiate an administrative proceeding against domestic companies or
associations, if it has reason to believe that those entities, through antidumping
procedures, engage in unfair or deceptive practices affecting commerce, and if it views
such administrative adjudication serves public interests, i.e., consumers’ welfare.
Although the Commission cannot review each and every antidumping litigation, it should
commence a proceeding if it has “reason to believe” that unfair practices have motivated
antidumping litigation.
Several occasions may satisfy this threshold test and function as triggers initiating
the Commission’s adjudication over certain antidumping petitions. First, if the
respondents of an antidumping action, i.e., foreign producers, argue that the
complainants, i.e., domestic producers, deliberately manipulate or misrepresent facts and
data to prevail in the antidumping proceeding, the Commission may take a close look at
such allegation to decide whether there is any suspicion or reason to believe that unfair
practices have been conducted on the side of domestic industries. Here, the Commission
need not rely necessarily on hard and direct evidence of bad faith in the petitioners: Even
certain “circumstantial evidence” may be adequate to justify initiation of an antitrust
investigation.261
Second, if the DOC or the ITC in their preliminary determination rules that no
dumping or injury has occurred, these negative findings may provide the FTC with
grounds for suspicion that domestic producers have engaged in anticompetitive behavior.
258
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Although the FTC should conduct a preliminary investigation on its own before it
concludes that an aborted antidumping petition involves certain wrongdoing and thus
justifies an independent administrative adjudication, negative determinations by the
DOC or the ITC might at least serve as a trigger for such a preliminary investigation by
the FTC.262
Third, the FTC may want to probe withdrawn antidumping petitions as a result of
settlement deals between complainants and respondents. Economists often point out that
these deals are a product of a cartelizing collusion among domestic and international
producers, and that they effectively fix domestic prices.263 This practice of withdrawal
after private deals has a certain demonstration effect on other foreign producers and
effectively conveys a price-raising signal to other respondents in similar antidumping
proceedings or to potential exporters.264 Therefore, these de facto price-fixing deals in the
form of private “price undertaking” tend to accord the FTC “reasons to believe” that
certain anticompetitive conducts may be involved. 265 In constructing these reasons, the
FTC should take into account any trade-restraining effects which the aforementioned
private settlements may cause, even though these settlements are technically within the
parameters of the antidumping statute and trade policies.266
If the FTC’s preliminary investigation raises a prima facie case of anticompetitive
behavior by antidumping petitioners, it should issue and serve a complaint explaining the
charges and including a notice of a hearing.267 If the Commission is not convinced by the
antidumping petitioner’s defense at the hearing, it may require withdrawal of the petition
or cancel price-fixing deals through a cease and desist order.
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b. Amicus Briefs
The FTC may offer their antitrust expertise to the ITC by submitting amicus briefs
and assisting the ITC in its injury determination. Considering its vast ability for collecting
economic data about U.S. industries and their market performance,268 the ITC, upon red
flags raised by FTC, can effectively take into account domestic industries’ market control
in deciding whether their alleged injuries from foreign dumping are justifiable. As Diane
Wood insightfully contended, the ITC may conclude, after reviewing data such as the
number of domestic firms and sales figures,269 that their alleged injuries either result from
more efficient foreign producers or purport to maintain economic rents flowing from their
monopolistic or oligopolistic position in a non-contestable domestic market.270 Under
these circumstances, the ITC should decline to find injuries for domestic industries
because doing so tends to maintain or solidify an anti-competitive market situation.271
In fact, one can find a premonition of this approach in the ITC’s past practices.
The ITC has often refused to find injuries when petitioners are found to be involved in
anti-competitive behaviors such as price-fixing. For example, in the early 1990’s when the
ferrosilicon price-fixing cartels were exposed and their members prosecuted, the ITC
revoked its previous injury determination prompted by these industries’ use of
antidumping petitions to harass foreign competitors.272 Therefore, if the ITC’s position is
to deny an antidumping shelter to domestic industries which desire to create or maintain
their anti-competitive position, it can do so by actively scanning antidumping petitions
through the an antitrust lens provided by the FTC in its amicus brief. The FTC is capable
of assisting the ITC in this competition-based scanning by means of its expertise in the
market/competition analysis. The FTC’s involvement in the ITC’s injury determination
can be a powerful tool preventing antidumping remedies from unduly overprotecting
domestic industries and thus unnecessarily impeding competition.273
c. Litigation
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The FTC can also make use of the federal courts in remedying antitrust violations
which may be committed by domestic industries engaging in antidumping actions. The
FTC has litigation authority in antitrust cases concurrently with the Attorney General274
but can independently represent itself in cases where the Attorney General declines to
act.275 Moreover, the FTC is exclusively authorized to represent itself “in its own name by
any of its attorneys” before the federal court under certain circumstances,276 such as when
it seeks injunctive relief under Section 13 of the FTC Act277 or consumer redress under
Section 19 of the FTC Act.278 Therefore, the FTC can sue domestic producers before a
federal court when they commit certain egregious anticompetitive behaviors, such as
conspiring to price-fix through threats of antidumping litigation.
As a guardian of public interest, the FTC should seek “preliminary or permanent
injunctive relief” against certain government actions related to antidumping remedies
when the proceedings were initiated by domestic producers to achieve anticompetitive
goals. 279 For example, if domestic producers deliberately provide manipulated facts to the
DOC, which in reliance on such facts as “facts available” makes a preliminary dumping
determination and subsequently imposes bonds for future antidumping duties, the FTC
may obtain preliminary injunctive relief against such a bond requirement to prevent any
injury to consumers.
C. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Formidable Obstacle to Antitrust Disciplines
1. The Noerr-Pennington Exemption: Its Jurisprudence and Rationale
As discussed above, antidumping remedies are to protect domestic industries from
foreign competition, and naturally involve a restraint on trade through severe
interference with prices and output of foreign rivals. These aspects directly concern the
very rationale of antitrust statutes such as the Sherman Act. Therefore, antidumping
remedies can be tamed through the FTC’s antitrust scrutiny.280 Unfortunately, however,
the applicability of antitrust statutes is prohibitively conditioned by a judicially crafted
antitrust exemption, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine gives antitrust immunity to domestic producers
who cooperate and exchange information among themselves in order to file antidumping
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suits against foreign producers. The brainchild of the Warren Court, the Noerr decision
predicated its rationale on the political freedom reified in the Bill of Rights, in particular
the freedom of expression under the First Amendment. In Noerr, railroad industries
lobbied and petitioned Congress to pass anti-truck legislation amid intense competition
with truckers.281 Justice Black viewed that the Sherman Act should not be employed to
bar those railroad industries from exercising their political rights of lobbying and
petitioning to pursue their interests.282
In Pennington, the Supreme Court further expanded the doctrinal reach of
Noerr. First, the Pennington Court also applied the Noerr immunity to lobbies directed
to the Executive branch, while the Noerr decision concerned lobbies to the Congress.
Second, Justice White, writing for the majority, further ruled that the union’s effort to
lobby and petition the Secretary of Labor should be given an antitrust immunity even if its
intention was to eliminate competition.284 Therefore, the Court immunized the miners’
union from antitrust scrutiny over their role in creating an agreement which eventually
led to a cartelization of coal industries in exchange for increased wages to union
members.285
283

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is premised on a staunch belief in the political
freedom embedded in the First Amendment. The doctrine, finding its theoretical
underpinnings in political pluralism and the “marketplace of ideas,” takes an optimistic
view of political competition among various interest groups which it believes will lead to a
rational outcome as “invisible hands” determine right prices in the market.286 Therefore,
in order for this political market to operate well, the autonomy of those interest groups
should be preserved and their privilege to pursue self-interests fully guaranteed without
restraints imposed by the government.287 In this very context, Justice Black’s opinion in
Noerr feared that an application of antitrust law under the Sherman Act would “disqualify
people from taking a public position on matters in which they are financially interested”
and would thus “deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances in
which that right may be of the most importance to them.” 288
However, this sanguine perspective on interest group politics has been heavily
criticized by pluralists themselves who have raised various empirical protests. For example,
Robert Dahl, qua a pluralist himself, admitted the so-called “dilemmas of the pluralist
Democracy” in which powerful interest groups may “stabiliz[e] inequalities, deform civic
281
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consciousness, and distort the public agenda.”289 Dahl warned against an anachronistically
naïve preposition to which classical pluralism clings. Modern private actors are no longer
atomistic players defined and controlled by mechanisms of the political marketplace.
With more power and efficient organization, private actors are now capable of controlling
and manipulating the political marketplace to their benefit.290 Therefore, Dahl’s insightful
observation is correct that without a radical restructuring of the borders of the private
and public spheres of the government, the democratic aspiration of “egalitarian pluralism”
cannot be fulfilled.291
2. A Broad Antitrust Immunity for Antidumping Petitioners: The Sham Exception and
Its Drawbacks
As discussed above, the political liberalism that served as the rationale for the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is prone to criticism. Forebodings over the doctrine’s broad
exemption led the Supreme Court to declare that doctrine would not be unqualified.
Justice Black himself came up with an exception to the doctrine in Noerr labeled “the
sham exception.” Under the sham exception, a domestic industry’s lobbying or petition is
a “mere sham [when used] to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”292
Critically, however, the sham exception has largely been fossilized without much
use on account of the court’s extremely narrow interpretation in subsequent cases. For
example, the Pennington Court refused to apply the sham exception even to those
situations in which parties explicitly revealed an antitrust intention, i.e., to eliminate
competition. Justice White wrote that “[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition” so long as
“[s]uch conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself
violative of the Sherman Act.”293
The subsequent court decisions further consolidated antitrust immunity under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine by narrowing the operational scope of the sham exception. In
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc (PRE), the Court
outlined a two-pronged definition of sham litigation.294 First, the complaint should be
“objectively baseless” in the sense that no reasonable litigant would expect success on the
merits.295 Second, only if the first prong is met, then the court will address the subjective
motivation for the litigation. The question is whether the litigant has attempted to
289
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directly interfere with the business relationship of a competitor through the use of
government process itself regardless of its outcome.296 The upshot is that the existence of
any “probable cause” to institute legal proceedings precludes the sham exception.297
Under the sham test, as watered down by the PRE decision, it appears practically
impossible to subject any antidumping petitions launched by domestic producers to an
antitrust scrutiny despite their oligopolistic intention as well as price-fixing effects of their
petitions. For example, even inaccurate petitions rife with “deliberate misstatements”
might not be objectively baseless if such petitions eventually prevail because “a winning
lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and therefore not a
sham.”298 Even a malicious antidumping suit, which is “intended solely to injure plaintiffs
competitively in a trade war that defendants appear to be losing, and not to secure the
trade relief for which such petitions were created by Congress,” would escape antitrust
scrutiny, if the petitioner could reasonably expect to win the case.299 Moreover, if a
government’s determination is not influenced by the misrepresentations, such
misrepresentations are not regarded as “material,” and thus do not bar the application of
the Noerr-Pennington exemption.300
The PRE case and subsequent lower court jurisprudence on the sham exception
are overly lax and thus highly troubling. This result-oriented jurisprudence on the sham
test tends to overprotect antidumping petitioners at the enormous expense of market
competition. Under this jurisprudence, even severe misrepresentations, such as frauds,
may be sheltered from an antitrust scrutiny. This jurisprudence is a recipe for procedural
abuse or irregularities. First of all, every petitioner who engages in misrepresentation
entertains some expectation that he or she will win the case. Accordingly, every
misrepresentation may be a reasonable effort toward trade remedies and therefore not a
sham. Moreover, a judge may not distinguish “material” misrepresentations from
immaterial ones. In other words, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish a
causation between a certain misrepresentation and a favorable government action. All in
all, misrepresentations made in the antidumping proceeding are, in most cases, likely to
pass the sham test in PRE.
Moreover, this pro-petitioner bias in the antidumping proceeding tends to bolster
the case for antitrust immunity by increasing the potential merits of any antidumping
complaint. Antidumping authorities’ generous stance toward imprecise information
296
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provided by petitioners boosts their chances to win the proceeding, especially when the
DOC may rely on such information as “facts available.”301 These elevated chances of
winning tend to clear the petitioner from the objective baselessness test under the sham
exception. Even if the ITC finds no injury to the petitioner and thus the original petition
can no longer stand on the merits, the petition may still not be objectively baseless if the
DOC still finds some dumping margins.302 Under these circumstances in which all the
government agencies or branches involved in antidumping proceedings, such as the DOC,
the ITC and the Court of International Trade, unabashedly favor the petitioners, a
reasonable petitioner would not in fact expect that they would ever lose.
In sum, this blanket antitrust immunity under the broadest construction of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the narrowest interpretation of the sham exception results
from the Warren Court’s internalization of a naively optimistic and thus flawed
understanding of interest group politics.303 This misunderstanding tends to sanction
spurious filings of antidumping petitions whose sole purpose is to harass competitive
foreign rivals and thus to block their access to domestic market. Moreover, this
overreaching antitrust immunity tends to put domestic industries in a more advantageous
position to force their foreign competitors to join a price-fixing cartel under the threat of
antidumping suits.304 Consequently, market competition comes to its demise in the name
of First Amendment rights.305

IV. Revitalizing Antitrust Options Applied to Trade Remedies
A. Judicial Reconstruction of the Sham Exception
Reconstructing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is inextricably linked to rethinking
the sham exception. Some lower court opinions inspiringly illustrate such potential. In
Ethyl, Judge Sloviter, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the majority which blindly
followed the PRE court’s obsession with the “objective baselessness” test. Highlighting the
Supreme Court’s solemn declaration in California Motor Transport as to the limitation of
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the Noerr-Pennington doctrine over fraudulent and unethical misrepresentations by
petitioners,306 Judge Solviter aptly observed in his dissent that:
[T]he majority ignores the risk that a party will intentionally use fraud and
misrepresentation to transform a claim that is otherwise weak and unlikely to
prevail, although not “objectively baseless,” into one that succeeds.307
Then, Judge Solviter prioritized the “fraud” over “objective baselessness” in an
effort to reconstruct the sham exception, citing some of the Court of Appeals decisions in
that direction. In Whelan, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down
a district court’s application of antitrust immunity on the ground that such immunity
should not be available when petitioners presented “deliberately false and material
representation” even if the litigation itself was not baseless.308 Likewise, in Kottle, the
Ninth Circuit held that a litigation may be a sham if a party’s “intentional
misrepresentations” to the court rid the litigation of its “legitimacy.”309
In a similar context, Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit potentially increased the
possibilities of subjecting antidumping petitions to antitrust scrutiny by broadening the
operational scope of the sham exception.310 In a likely departure from the strictures of
political expression under PRE, Judge Posner in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works
revived the critical importance of harassing intents of litigants in determining whether
filing a lawsuit is a sham.311 Employing the common law tort of abusive process, Judge
Posner held that a litigant crossed the line and thus was subject to antitrust scrutiny via
the sham exception, even if he or she presents a probable cause or colorful claim, so long
as his or her sole purpose is not to win the case but to harass competitors regardless of the
outcome of the case.312
In a subsequent case, Judge Easterbrook, based on Judge Posner’s analysis in GripPak, held that cost-justification in a lawsuit should determine sham liability.313 If a
litigant’s litigation cost is well beyond a prospective benefit from the merits of the case, no
rational person would engage in such litigation because there is no cost-justification. The
only foreseeable benefit would be from an upsurge of litigation costs to a rival to the
extent that the current market price is sustained.314 If such a foreseeable benefit exists,
such cases would fall under the rubric of sham litigation.
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The Grip-Pak case law tends to furnish courts with critical avenues allowing
antitrust scrutiny of possible anticompetitive behaviors by antidumping petitioners. More
often than not, a powerful association of domestic producers files antidumping suits
against small foreign producers in an attempt to thwart their entries to the U.S. market.
In this adversarial proceeding, foreign respondents, which are often small companies, are
highly disadvantaged vis-à-vis big domestic petitioners who are armed with big law firms
and accountants. As stated before, the mere filing of an antidumping petition, regardless
of its merit, can financially burden foreign producers, and thus be an effective harassment
technique.315 The antidumping authorities’ heavy reliance on facts and data provided by
petitioners further disadvantages respondents.316 Therefore, one can easily locate a
petitioner’s intent to harass when he or she deliberately exaggerates or manipulates price
and output data in their antidumping petitions.
Considering the foregoing predatory nature of antidumping procedures, the court
should rationalize an operational scope for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine through a more
proactive use of the sham exception in line with the Grip-Pak decision. One possible way
of doing so is to introduce a presumption of a “sham’s” existence whenever a deliberate
misrepresentation is detected. A deliberate misrepresentation in an antidumping
proceeding is a grave non-price predation which should raise a red flag despite the First
Amendment considerations. Thus, those petitioners who deliberately misrepresent critical
facts in order to prevail in an antidumping proceeding should be deprived of antitrust
immunity, at least provisionally. Unless petitioners can rebut the presumption by proving
that their misrepresentations have not been material, i.e., have not controlled
determinations by antidumping authorities, they should be subject to an antitrust scrutiny.
This way, the court can restore a balance between political freedom and market
competition which has been skewed toward the former under the hitherto operation of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
In sum, under circumstances where deliberate misrepresentation or fraud is
perpetrated on antidumping authorities for predatory purposes, the courts should
presumptively find the petition to be “objectively baseless” and thus constituting a
“sham.” Unless domestic petitioners can rebut the presumption, they should be stripped
of the Noerr-Pennington immunity and thus subject to antitrust scrutiny over their alleged
predatory behavior under the Sherman Act.
B. FTC’s Effective Surveillance over the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
1. FTC Enforcement and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
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As discussed above, the FTC, as an enforcer of the Sherman Act, bears the
principal responsibility for monitoring whether sham litigations are launched in violation
of the Sherman Act, i.e., by using the antidumping mechanism as a sheer instrumentality
of restricting market competition. In its recent Unocal decision, the Commission
emphasized that:
Whether we view misrepresentation as a distinct variant of sham petitioning or as
a separate exception to Noerr-Pennington, the fabric of existing law is rich enough
to extend antitrust coverage, in appropriate circumstances, to anticompetitive
conduct flowing from deliberate misrepresentations that undermine the legitimacy
of government proceedings.317
A mere commencement of antitrust investigation should not be automatically
translated into any affirmative determination of antitrust liability. The FTC will still be
subject to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the Commission’s findings are judicially
reviewable. Nonetheless, the FTC’s active review of antidumping proceeding would
convey a powerful warning to domestic producers who might be tempted to abuse the
antidumping remedies and thus would deter, to a considerable extent, spurious or
harassing petitions based on manipulated or false information. This kind of FTC oversight
could help to remedy the current situation in which nearly a half of all antidumping
petitions turn out to be without merits (no dumping margins).318
First, if the width and depth of cooperation among domestic industries in the
petition stage goes beyond what is deemed necessary to launch an antidumping complaint,
such conduct may not be protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and thus subject to
antitrust scrutiny by the FTC. The FTC, along with the Department of Justice, states
that:
[W]ere the parties directly to exchange extensive information relating to their
costs, the prices each has charged for the product, pricing trends, and profitability,
including information about specific transactions that went beyond the scope of
those facts required for the adjudication, such conduct would go beyond the
contemplated protection of Noerr immunity.319
317
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Second, the FTC should actively employ a new doctrinal test introduced in the
recent Unocal decision for deliberate misrepresentation.320 In Unocal, the Commission
spelled out a two-tiered test in which a petition with misrepresentations would lose the
Noerr-Pennington protection in non-political contexts such as an antidumping proceeding:
first, the misrepresentation or omission must be “deliberate, factually verifiable, and
central to the outcome of the proceeding or case”; second, “it [must be] possible to
demonstrate and remedy this effect without undermining the integrity of the deceived
governmental entity.”321 The Unocal test is supported by a number of lower court
decisions rejecting the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine with regards to cases
involving deliberate misrepresentations.322 Therefore, the Unocal test could provide
effective regulation in the typical misrepresentation situation in the antidumping
proceeding.
Critically, the Unocal test follows a different jurisprudential path from the PRE
Court and thus is doctrinally distinguishable from the PRE sham exception. The Unocal
test derives from Allied Tube in which the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished conduct
that “genuinely seeks to achieve [a] governmental result, but does so through improper
means” from a traditional meritless sham situation which the PRE case targeted.323
Therefore, the Unocal test can overcome an extremely narrow scope of the sham
exception defined by the first prong (“objective baselessness” test) in PRE because the test
concerns those misrepresentations which do seek favorable government actions, such as
affirmative dumping/injury determinations, not just meritless (sham) petitions. As a result,
the Unocal test provides a powerful check against these “unethical and deceptive
practices,”324 such as data manipulation or other misrepresentation by petitioners in the
antidumping proceeding. Accordingly, the Unocal test is preferable in deterring
anticompetitive behavior damaging to the economy while posing no threats to political
freedom.
Last but not least, the FTC should carve out an exception to the Noerr protection
with regards to repetitively filed antidumping petitions through which the petitions are
aimed at harassing foreign competitors regardless of the outcome.325 Due to the lack of res
judicata and collateral estoppel in antidumping proceedings, domestic producers can file
new petitions on the same subject-matter even if they fail to succeed in the first round.326
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The PRE test would not apply to repetitive antidumping petitions because that case
involved a single petition.327 Even though some of individual filings in the repetitive
continuum may be successful and thus would not fail under the sham test in PRE,
repetitive filing as a whole should still be subject to antitrust scrutiny if they are a part of a
strategy to harass competitors regardless of the merit.328 In other words, “[r]epetitive
filings, some of which are successful and some unsuccessful, may support an inference that
the process is being misused.”329
2. The FTC Registration of the Noerr-Pennington Exemption
In addition to the aforementioned ex post monitoring, the Commission can also
employ a more preemptive, ex ante monitoring scheme. Under its administrative
rulemaking authority,330 the FTC may require domestic industries to register with the
Commission before they benefit from the Noerr-Pennington exemption in jointly launching
antidumping petitions against foreign producers. This requirement serves two main
purposes. First, it puts the Commission in a better position to monitor possible
anticompetitive behaviors which may fall within the rubric of “sham” litigation. It is
crucial for the Commission to get information as to which companies or associations file
antidumping petitions because it can detect oligopolistic behavior or cartelizing more
effectively than the courts. Second, such a requirement tends to exert psychological
pressure under the shadow of the Commission’s potential Sherman Act investigation of
antidumping complainants and thus deters abusive behavior, such as deliberate
misrepresentation of facts.
This rulemaking proposal is not unprecedented: it has already been adopted and
implemented in a parallel area. The Webb-Pomerene Act331 provides a case in point. The
Act, legislated in 1918, is to permit U.S. exporters to collude among themselves in foreign
markets under the exemption of the Sherman Act. This Act purports to prevent U.S.
small and medium exporters from being disadvantaged in foreign markets from its own
domestic law vis-à-vis foreign rivals who were seldom subject to the rigorous antitrust
disciplines.332 Nonetheless, the Webb-Pomerene Act does not tolerate any antitrust
consequences within the U.S. For example, if those exporters attempt to “artificially or
327
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intentionally enhance or depress” U.S. prices on similar products that they trade or
“substantially lessen competition” within the U.S., such behaviors are not immune from
the Sherman Act.333 Highlighting these exceptions, the FTC, by promulgating its own
rules, reiterated a limited antitrust exemption under the Webb-Pomerene Act and
declared its potential antitrust jurisdiction in those situations falling under the
exceptions.334
The FTC’s rule-making experience under the Webb-Pomerene Act sheds light on
its similar responsibilities over the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Both the Webb-Pomerene
Act and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine concern an antitrust immunity rendered to protect
U.S. industries from foreign competition arising under international trade. Yet, an
antitrust immunity under both situations is not unlimited and conditioned by certain
exceptions. Therefore, the FTC, as it does under the Webb-Pomerene Act, should set an
internal rule by which to check and monitor whether these exceptions to antitrust
exception are triggered by domestic industries’ possible abusive use of antidumping
petitions. Under the proposed registration or notification rule, the Commission, while it
still accommodates the judge-made Noerr-Pennington exemption, can extend its potential
jurisdiction to any abusive antitrust behaviors, such as sham petitions, which cannot be
protected even under the exemption.335 If the Commission has “reason to believe” that
those abusive behaviors occur in violation of the Sherman Act, it may initiate an
investigation.336 If the Commission concludes after the investigation that the Act is
violated, it may recommend domestic companies or association to withdraw their
antidumping petitions.337
C. Disapplying the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Based on Tort
In an attempt to narrow the scope of antitrust immunity, Gary Minda linked
common law remedies (e.g., the tort of abusive litigation) to antitrust challenges against
predatory behaviors or other anticompetitive actions to restrain trade.338 First, he finds a
possibility to “disapply” the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under certain circumstances in
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.339 which justified the
introduction of common law remedies in the area of antitrust disciplines.340 In Walker
Process, the Supreme Court held that the enforcement of a patent earned by fraud in
order to restrain trade may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.341 By focusing on the
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fraudulent behaviors and anticompetitive motivations of the petitioner, the Court paved
the way for disciplining abusive petitioning without engaging in the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.342 When applied to antidumping complaints, the Walker Process case law can be
adopted by a court, at least by analogy, to subject domestic industries’ predatory
antidumping petitions based on deliberate misrepresentations on facts and data, to the
Sherman Act disciplines, without any need to engage the doctrine of Noerr-Pennington
immunity.
This approach of stripping antidumping petitioners of the Noerr-Pennington
privilege via tort doctrines, like tortious interference, hinges on basic values which the
general tort system aims to protect, such as fairness and business ethics.343 If domestic
producers abuse the import relief, such as the antidumping mechanism, through an
intentional, deliberate use of false information and misstatements, they fail to comply
with the “rules of the game,” and the value of competition is compromised beyond the
permissible exception.344 Under these circumstances, antitrust immunity which is reserved
for normal joint petitioning under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is no longer applied.
Nonetheless, it remains uncertain whether the court subscribes to this tort-based
disapplication of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In fact, the Third Circuit in Ethyl
extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine even to common law tort claims. In this case, an
Indian ibuprofen manufacture, Cheminor, sued an American ibuprofen manufacturer,
Ethyl, on the grounds of antitrust violation and common law torts, of unfair competition
and tortious interference. Ethyl was the only bulk ibuprofen producer in the U.S. before
Cheminor started to export bulk ibuprofen to the U.S. After failing to lobby the USTR to
block the Cheminor’s market access, Ethyl filed an antidumping and countervailing duty
suit against Cheminor and succeeded to obtain a decision ordering Cheminor to pay
43.71 % duties on their export amounts.345 This additional cost forced Cheminor to
retreat from the U.S. market, which was followed by Ethyl’s withdrawal of its petition.346
Cheminor then sued Ethyl on both grounds of antitrust and common law tort.
The district court dismissed the antitrust claim under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and rejected jurisdiction over the common law tort on procedural grounds.347
The Third Circuit also dismissed the antitrust claim by applying the Noerr-Pennington
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doctrine. At the same time, it extended the same doctrine to the tort claims and thus
rejected them.348 The court held that:
[We] have been presented with no persuasive reason why these state tort claims,
based on the same petitioning activity as the federal claims, would not be barred
by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.349
The court basically viewed that the First Amendment principles should apply to
the New Jersey tort claims, based on Brownsville which held that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine immunizes tort liability for the failure of reporting nursing home violations to
regulatory authorities.350
However, the dissenting judge in Ethyl, Judge Sloviter who was the very author of
the Brownsville opinion, argued that the majority’s interpretation of the sham exception
was flawed and thus unduly narrowed the operational scope of the Sherman Act.351 He
also contended that Brownsville should not be read to warrant the majority’s broad
application of antitrust immunity to common law tort claims because the decision simply
dismissed a damage action against a legitimate reporting activity and should thus be
distinguished from the current case which elicited government actions via alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations.352
Therefore, one might reasonably conclude that deliberate and fraudulent
misrepresentations in the antidumping proceeding could be potentially subject to
common law tort claims and thus block the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Conclusion
This Article has argued that antidumping remedies, while unsupported by the
unfair trade justification, serve the special interests of certain domestic producers at the
expense of consumers. It, therefore, contends that the courts should clear antitrust
disciplines of doctrinal obstructions, most notably the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, through
a broader construction of the sham exception. In addition, antitrust authorities, in
particular the FTC, should pursue enforcement efforts over certain abusive behaviors by
antidumping petitioners and introduce a registration scheme in line with the WebbPomerene Act. Finally, the courts should decline to apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
to cases based on common law tort principles such as unfair interference with business.
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While “the first amendment has not been interpreted to preclude liability for false
statements,”353 the courts have failed to provide clear guidance as to the scope of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.354 This Article locates room for the FTC to make use of its
statutory jurisdiction over trade remedies and calls for a proactive stance by the FTC on
this issue. In doing so, the FTC can achieve the same goal shared by trade and antitrust
policies, “to remove barriers to the competitive process.”355 Administrative protections,
such as antidumping measures, not only impede international commerce but also cause
market distortions, which prevents growth and job creation both domestically and
internationally.356 Antitrust oversight of trade remedies will eventually bring forth the
salutary effect of forcing domestic producers to become more innovative and competitive
in the global market.357
J. Michael Finger once portrayed the antidumping regime as a “witches’ brew of
the worst of policy-making: power politics, bad economics, and shameful public
administration.”358 Now, it is time to break the spell cast by this protectionist brew using
an antitrust antidote.
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